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Fisher v. Angelone
163 F.3d 835 (4th Cir. 1998)
L Facts
The evidence leading to the conviction and sentence of David Fisher
("Fisher") is somewhat complex. In summary, it tended to show the follow-
ing: Fisher met David Wilkey ("Wilkey") at a motel in 1982.1 After the two
became friends, Wilkey moved into Fisher's apartment and occasionally
worked for him. 2 Fisher devised a plan whereby Wilkey would become
close to a young woman, Bonnie Jones ("Jones"), Fisher would obtain an
insurance policy on her life, and Wilkey would kill Bonnie in return for a
share of the insurance proceeds.' Fisher provided Wilkey a car and money
to date Jones, but Wilkey eventually fell in love with the woman and
refused to go through with the plan.'
In the summer of 1983, Fisher made a similar proposal to Bobby
Mulligan ("Mulligan"), this time targeting Wilkey; Fisher would obtain an
insurance policy on Wilkey before the three men went on a hunting trip
during which Mulligan would kill Wilkey in exchange for a share of the
insurance proceeds.' Fisher also approached Gerald Steadham ("Steadham")
with a plan to kill Wilkey. Steadham was to push Wilkey off a ledge on a
fishing trip in exchange for a cut of the insurance money.
6
Steadham accompanied Fisher to a local office of the Kentucky Central
Life Insurance Company "Kentucky Central).' Despite the fact that he had
no legitimate insurable interest, Fisher was nevertheless able to obtain an
insurance policy on Wilkey's life in the amount of $50,000 with double a
indemnity clause in case of accidental death.' The original application listed
Fisher as Wilkey's "guardian" and the owner and beneficiary of the policy.9
After the agent issuing the policy was unable to demonstrate that Fisher was
in fact Wilkey's court-appointed guardian, however, Kentucky Central










temporarily changed the beneficiary to Wilkey's estate.1" But soon thereaf-
ter, and for reasons which are still unclear, the company eventually agreed
to again change the beneficiary to "David Fisher, personal friend."" At
about the same time, Fisher informed Mulligan that although he initially
had problems getting the policy, a promise of one third of the proceeds had
persuaded the insurance agent to "take care of it." 2 Fisher then promised
Mulligan a little more than one third of the proceeds ($38,000) because he
was to actually do the killing.13
In November of 1983, the plan to kill Wilkey came to fruition. Fisher,
Mulligan, Wilkey and Jody Ayers ("Ayers"), a 16 year old son of Fisher's ex-
wife, went deer hunting in Virginia. 4 Fisher's role included providing the
guns, disposing of the murder weapon, and having the body cremated, while
Mulligan was to be the trigger man." When Wilkey chased a deer down a
hill, Mulligan followed with Fisher close behind.' 6 After Mulligan shot
Wilkey, Fisher yelled for Ayers to get help and then attempted to insert his
hand into the wound in order to stop Wilkey's heart."
When the rescue squad arrived on the scene, Mulligan and Fisher both
gave statements to the effect that Mulligan had slipped while running
downhill and the gun had discharged accidentally. 8 Fisher and Mulligan
were tried and convicted of misdemeanors. 9 Two days later, Fisher filed a
claim for the $100,000 accidental death benefit on the insurance policy he
held on Wilkey's life.2" The company initiated an investigation of the death
and referred the matter to a local attorney.2' After the attorney questioned
Fisher about discrepancies between Fisher's statements and the autopsy
report, Fisher accepted a check from the attorney for $25,000 in exchange22 2
for a release of his claim. Fisher later paid Mulligan $7,000 of this sum.
Two years later, Mulligan had a nervous breakdown and confessed his


















murder.2" After he became worried about his own life, Steadham also went
to the FBI.26 Before Fisher knew he had been indicted, Steadham met with
Fisher and secretly taped lengthy conversations during which they occasion-
ally discussed Wilkey's murder.27
Fisher was convicted of capital murder and, during the penalty phase
of the bifurcated proceeding, the jury recommended he be sentenced to
death.2" The Circuit Court of the City of Bedford adopted the jury's
recommendations. After exhausting direct appeals29 and state habeas, Fisher
sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia. The district court denied the writ, and Fisher
appealed.30 On appeal he claimed he was entitled to habeas relief on the
following grounds: (1) extraneous juror interference; (2) his trial counsel
were ineffective for (a) failing to challenge the admissibility of his taped
conversations with a government witness, (b) failing to develop and present
evidence to rebut the aggravating factor of future dangerousness, (c) failing
to develop and present additional mitigating evidence, (d) opening the door
to evidence of his parole eligibility status, and (e) failing to object when the
burden was placed on him to prove that he should not be sentenced to
death; (3) the cumulative effect of his trial counsel's individual errors ren-
dered their assistance ineffective; (4) his court-appointed mental health
experts were constitutionally ineffective; and (5) the Supreme Court of
Virginia failed to review his sentence for proportionality.3'
II. Holding
The court of appeals rejected all of Fisher's claims.
IL Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. juror Misconduct
In his first claim, Fisher asserted that extraneous juror interference had
tainted his jury, thereby denying him a fair trial in violation of the Sixth3
Amendment. Although Fisher raised this claim as a single issue, the Fourth
Circuit, for reasons which will later become apparent, addressed the claim as
two issues, hereinafter referred to as "Claim XT' and "Claim XXXIV.""
25. Id
26. Id at 50.
27. Id
28. Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 841 (4th Cir. 1998).
29. Id. See Fisher v. Virginia, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989) (denying writ of certiorari).







In Claim XI, Fisher alleged that members of the jury had been exposed
to documents and recordings which had not been admitted into evidence
and to out-of-court statements from persons not on the jury, thereby
violating his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.34
The circuit court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the claim
as procedurally barred on the basis of Slayton v. Parrigan" and the Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed.36 In his federal habeas petition, Fisher argued
that he could demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural
default due to the fact that the factual basis for his claim was unavailable at
the time of his direct appeal." The court of appeals rejected Fisher's claim,
ruling that its basis was available to him at the time of his direct appeal.3"
However, it is clear that, as a practical matter, it was not. Fisher had re-
quested that the circuit court allow him to interview jurors, but his request
was denied on the ground that he had failed to make a "threshold showing
of juror misconduct."39 Evidence of misconduct was, of course, precisely the
information Fisher did not have and hoped to uncover by interviewing the
jurors. Under the circumstances of such a "Catch-22," it is obvious that in
reality this claim was not available to Fisher.
2. Claim XXXIV
In Claim XXXIV, first raised in a motion to amend his state habeas
petition, Fisher claimed that juror Bertha Thomas ("Thomas") had been
improperly influenced by her husband.' According to Thomas's affidavit,
which was the basis for the motion to amend but which was not submitted
with the motion, her husband told her to vote for the death penalty if she
"was the lone 'hold out' juror against a sentence of death."41 Despite the fact
that under the law at that time no time limits were imposed on habeas
petitioners, the Commonwealth opposed the motion to amend "on the
ground of timeliness."42 The Commonwealth also objected to Claim
XXXIV on the ground that it was "conclusory and insufficiently pleaded."4
34. I. at 844.
35. 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974) (holding claim which could have been, but was not,
raised on direct appeal may not be raised in collateral proceedings).
36. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 844.
37. Md.
38. Id
39. Id at 841.
40. Id at 845.
41. Id (citing J.A. at 2355).
42. Id (citing J.A. at 2420).
43. Id at 842 (citing J.A. at 2421).
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After first taking the decision under advisement, the circuit court refused to
admit the affidavit, ruling "that it (1) represented an effort to impeach the
jury verdict, (2) was not relevant to the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel, (3) was untimely, and (4) was unreliable.""'In accord with the circuit court's ruling on May 26, 1993, its Order
noted that Fisher's motion to amend his petition further "was granted in
part."4" The Order failed, however, to explain the court's grounds for
denying Fisher's motion to add Claim XXXIV. The question before the
Fourth Circuit, therefore, was whether the circuit court denied the claim on
procedural grounds (in which case the issue would be procedurally de-
faulted) or on substantive grounds (in which case it would not).46
The Fourth Circuit held that, for several reasons, two of which are
discussed below, the circuit court denied Claim XXXIV on procedural
grounds.4" First, as noted above, even though no time limits were imposed
on habeas counsel, the Fourth Circuit concluded that due to the fact that the
Commonwealth had repeatedly grounded its objection to the motion on
timeliness, the circuit court must also have made its decision on that
ground.4" Second, the court of appeals ruled that the circuit court never
discussed the merits of Claim XXXIV when it denied the motion to amend.
This is most curious given that the court of appeals itself claimed that the
circuit court denied the motion because it: "(1) represented an effort to
impeach the jury ... [and] (4) was unreliable."4 Without more, the Fourth
Circuit ruled this was not a substantive ruling based on the following
completely conclusory language of the district court: "[a] careful reading of
the.., passage.., reveals that the judge was not ruling on the motion to
amend, but merely refusing to accept [the Thomas] affidavit[ ] into evi-
dence."50
In order to avoid the "damned if you do, damned if you don't" posi-
tion into which Fisher's defense counsel was placed, defense counsel seeking
to interview jurors have two options. First, at the end of the trial they may
44. Id, at 846 (citing J.A. at 2714).
45. Id at 842 (citing J.A. at 2824).
46. It is clear that as a matter of substance, under the authority of Stockton v. Virginia,
852 F.2d 740, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1988), Fisher would have been entitled to relief on his juror
misconduct claim. In that case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the defendant was
prejudiced when the owner of the diner at which jurors were recessed for lunch explained
that "they ought to fry the son of a bitch." Id.
47. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 845-476. The Fourth Circuit's other "reasons" as to why the
claim was dismissed on procedural, and not substantive, grounds by the circuit court, are
nothing more than conclusions: The circuit court did not consider the merits of Claim
XXXIV at the hearing, nor did Fisher explicitly argue on habeas appeal to the Supreme Court
of Virginia that the circuit court's dismissal was substantive. Id at 847.
48. Id at 846.
49. Id (citing J.A. at 2714).
50. Id. at 847 (quoting J.A. at 3491 n.3 (emphasis omitted)).
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file a motion seeking permission to interview jurors, citing this case for the
proposition that counsel must do so in order to avoid defaulting any avail-
able claim. Counsel pursuing this option must, under all circumstances, be
sure to federalize the claim by also framing the request under the Sixth
Amendment rights to an impartial jury and effective assistance of counsel.
A second option is to simply interview the jurors without filing a motion.
Nothing, absent a court order, prevents counsel from doing so. Attorneys
may not harass jurors, of course, but are not required to obtain prior per-
mission to contact them. In either event, counsel must keep in mind that
under Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 1:1 they have only 21 days after the
end of trial during which they may file motions based on misconduct."'
This may present a practical problem as jurors may be unwilling to talk to
defense counsel immediately after trial because it is likely that they will be
sitting on other juries and may feel too emotionally involved in their
decision to be willing to speak about it. One of the two options should be
employed, however, in virtually every case.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Fisher raised a variety of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the
majority of which are explained below. 2 Under Strickland v. Washington,3
a petitioner must demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and "that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."" Also, the court claimed to find in
Lockhart v. Fretwellss further guidance in interpreting the prejudice prong. 56
That guidance is, as is explained in detail in the following section, misplaced.
In his first ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Fisher challenged his
counsel's failure to object adequately to the admissibility of six taped conver-
51. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:26.
52. Fisher raised several ineffective assistance of counsel claims which are not discussed
in this summary. In one, Fisher claimed his right to effective counsel was denied him due to
his counsel's failure to present evidence indicating he had not in fact been charged with
several crimes for which he, while secretly being taped, bragged to a government witness he
had been tried and acquitted. The court dismissed the claim on both objective unreasonable-
ness and prejudice grounds. In another, Fisher contended that his trial counsel was ineffective
in asking the trial court to place the burden on him at his proportionality review hearing to
prove that he should not be sentenced to death. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the claim,
citing the district court's conclusion that "[t]here was no burden shifting here, and even a
cursory reading of the record ... reveals that fact." Fisher, 163 F.3d at 848 (citing J.A. at
3597).
53. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
54. Strickland v..Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
55. 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993).
56. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 848.
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sations he engaged in with Gerald Steadham, a government witness, two of
which were taped after Fisher was indicted. 7 Although the admission of
these Rost-indictment tapings clearly violated the rule of Massiah v. United
States that "[a] petitioner [is] denied the basic protections of [the Sixth
Amendment] guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence
of his own incriminating words, which [government] agents had deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his
counsel," 9 Fisher's trial counsel failed to state the grounds for his objection
and was overruled. Although the court of appeals, through extraordinarily
strained reasoning, 6' concluded that this was not objectively unreasonable,
it was also able to dispose of the claim on the prejudice ground, citing what
it called the "prosecution's overwhelming case against Fisher."61
It is clear that Fisher's trial counsel should have stated the grounds for
his objection. In addition, as the Capital Defense Journal repeatedly empha-
sizes, defense counsel must be mindful of the overwhelming obstacles posed
by procedural default. In order to insure a claim is preserved, it must be
framed as a violation of both the United States Constitution and any
applicable state law.
In his next ineffective assistance claim, Fisher contended his counsel
was ineffective for failing to develop and present certain mitigating
evidence.62 In particular, Fisher claimed his trial counsel unreasonably failed
to (1) research Fisher's mental illness, (2) investigate Fisher's criminal
history, and (3) contact Fisher's family and other witnesses regarding miti-
gating evidence.63
The court of appeals concluded that Fisher's counsel was not unconsti-
tutionally ineffective for failing to investigate Fisher's mental state because
the introduction of any such evidence might have led the Commonwealth
to cross-examine mental health experts about Fisher's propensity for future
violence and might have led to the introduction of evidence of his prior
criminal record as a juvenile."4 Thus, it concluded that "counsel's strategic
decision not to introduce Fisher's medical records was [not] objectively
unreasonable." 5
57. Id at 849.
58. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
59. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
60. In essence, the Fourth Circuit "reasoned" that counsel's failure to state the basis for
his objection to the introduction of the tapes was not unreasonable because, once the tapes
were admitted over his objection, counsel insisted the tapes be played in full so as to prevent
the jury from hearing the statements out of context. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 849.
61. Id
62. Id. at 849-50.





The court disposed of Fisher's claim that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel due to his counsel's failure to contact family members
with the "Client Excuse Loop-hole." The court excused counsel's failure to
investigate Fisher's family background on the ground that Fisher told him
his family would not provide any helpful information.' Thus, it concluded
that "counsel's strategic decision" not to call family witnesses was reason-
able.67
Upon any indication of mental illness, counsel should actively pursue
any avenue which might yield evidence of such mental disability, including
contacting family members. The rule of economy which dictates that
counsel cannot be expected to pursue all lines of evidentiary inquiry simply
does not apply in a capital case because the consequences of failing to do so
are so much greater than anywhere else. It should be remembered, of
course, that if defense counsel pursues a line of investigation which yields
a result that, as the Fourth Circuit guessed it might, is more likely to damage
than help a defendant's case, counsel can simply make the "strategic deci-
sion" not to introduce it. If, however, as was the case here, counsel fails to
pursue the inquiry in its entirety, not putting on the evidence is less a
"decision" and more an uneducated conclusion that the defendant is in fact
competent to direct the trial.
A similar problem may be found in the court's resolution of the claim
that Fisher's counsel was ineffective due to his failure to explain that Fisher's
prior felonies were all non-violent." The court rejected it on the prejudice
prong, but the first question asked might have been why trial counsel
permitted twenty-five non-violent felonies to be introduced into evidence
at all. Motions in limine are available to weed out irrelevant evidence.69
66. IdM at 851.
67. Id.
68. Id at 850.
69. Fisher made two further ineffective assistance claims which will not be addressed
in detail in this case note. First, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective due to the fact
that he claimed, during the penalty phase of Fisher's trial, that if the jury sentenced Fisher
to a term of life "he [would] never see the sun shine again except through bars." Id at 851
(quoting J.A. at 1736). Because the trial court erroneously took this as counsel erroneously
suggesting that Fisher would be ineligible for parole, the court permitted the Commonwealth
to point out that a life sentence would not necessarily mean that Fisher would be behind bars
for the rest of his life. Id. Fisher challenged this ruling on direct and state habeas appeal. Id
At no point, however, did Fisher contend that his trial counsel was ineffective for opening
the door to the prosecution's response. Id. The court of appeals therefore concluded that
Fisher failed to exhaust his remediesi which constitutes a procedural default in Virginia. Id.
(citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit did so because a Virginia Statute, then in effect,
permitted him to raise his ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. See Frye v. Common-
wealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 286-87 (Va. 1986) (citing former VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-317.1,
(repealed 1990)). What the court of appeals failed to mention, however, was that at the time
Fisher made his direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia had, with no guidance whatso-
ever from the legislature, effectively overuled the statute by devising a rule which, because
[Vol. 11:2
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C Deprivation of Fair Trial
Fisher claimed that even if each of his trial counsel's errors, taken on
their own, did not amount to a Sixth Amendment violation, the cumulative
effect of those errors, taken in their entirety, did so.7" The Fourth Circuit
rejected this argument, citing Lockhart v. Fretwell" for the proposition that
a violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair trial guarantee could not occur
absent an individual constitutional violation." Under this very narrow
interpretation of the Constitution, if counsel commits a multitude of errors,
a violation of the Sixth Amendment nevertheless cannot occur absent a
finding that counsel's performance, as to at least one of those errors, was
constitutionally deficient, and that, again in regard only to that particular
error, the petitioner was prejudiced thereby. As is explained below, it seems
Fisher was likely correct in contending that both logic and United States
Supreme Court precedent demand a more expansive reading of the right to
a fair trial.
Fisher claimed that assessing the cumulative impact of counsel's errors
is appropriate in at least three circumstances. Fisher agreed with the Fourth
Circuit that a showing of constitutionally deficient performance resulting
in prejudice amounts to a violation of the Sixth Amendment-this is noth-
ing more than garden variety Strickland v. Washington" error. The prob-
lem, however, with limiting cumulative impact claims to instances in which
Strickland error can be shown is an obvious one: if a Strickland violation as
to a particular error has occurred, there is no need to assess the cumulative
impact of all of counsel's errors because a constitutional error has already
occurred. Therefore, Fisher contended cumulative impact should obviously
not be limited to Strickland errors, and, unlike the Fourth Circuit, suggested
it is appropriate in at least two other instances.
of the availability of habeas proceedings, forbade petitioners from raising claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Walker v. Mitchell, 299 S.E.2d 698, 699 (Va. 1983) (ruling "in the
interests of both the Commonwealth and the accused, the ends of justice dictate the adoption
of a rule restricting to habeas corpus proceedings the litigation of claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel"). The statute permitting the raising of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims was eventually repealed, thereby making it clear that ineffective assistance claims may
only be raised in habeas proceedings. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution and
despite the fact that trial and direct a ppeal counsel are virtually always the same, trial counsel
are advised that if it appears from the record alone that counsel was ineffective, that claim
should be made on appeal and/or appointment of different appellate counsel sought.
Fisher also claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the trial court to
place the burden on him at his post-trial hearing. The court of a ppeals summarily dismissed
this claim on the grounds that the burden had not been placedon him and, even if it had
been, Fisher was not prejudiced thereby. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852 (citing J.A. at 3597).
70. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852.
71. 506 U.S. 364 (1994).
72. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852 (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370 n.2 (1993)).
73. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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First, Fisher contended that if there have been several constitutional
errors which, taken individually, do not prejudice the defendant, the cumu-
lative impact of those errors may do so. This seems plainly required. For
example, assume that a defendant was convicted solely on the basis of three
pieces of evidence, each of which was clearly inadmissable. If counsel failed
to object to the introduction of each piece of evidence, counsel would have
committed three performance prong errors. But if the defendant raised a
claim of ineffective assistance as to any one of those pieces of evidence, it
would fail on the prejudice prong because a court would find that the
defendant would have been convicted on the basis of the two other pieces
of evidence, despite the fact that they too were inadmissable. Because this
result makes no sense, it seems plainly obvious that logic requires that a
petitioner be permitted to raise a claim of ineffective assistance as to the
cumulative impact of errors which violate the performance prong, despite
the fact that they would not, taken on their own, be successful.
Counsel should note that in dismissing Fisher's fair trial claim the court
of appeals lent support for evaluating the cumulative effect of "harmless"
constitutional errors, when, in discussing a circuit split on the issue, it
explained that:
[t]he courts in question merely aggregated all of the actual constitutional
errors that individually had been found to be harmless, and therefore not
reversible, and analyzed whether their cumulative effect on the outcome
of the trial was such that collectively they could no longer be determined
to be harmless.... Thus legitimate cumulative-error analysis evaluates
only the effect of matters actually determined to be constitutional error,
not the cumulative effect of all of counsel's actions deemed deficient.7'
Fisher also contended that a cumulative impact claim may be made
even as to errors which do not rise to the level Strickland performance
prong errors. Although the case for this interpretation is not as strong as is
that for constitutional errors (described above), counsel is nevertheless
advised to make it. The Supreme Court has never held that the cumulative
effect of trial counsel errors which are not themselves unconstitutional may
not be considered in assessing an unfair trial claim. In fact, language in
Strickland itself indicates that a violation of the Sixth Amendment may
occur even absent a showing of constitutional violation. There, the Su-
preme Court explained that "the ultimate focus of [ineffective assistance of
counsel] inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding
whose result is being challenged.""5 It also noted that "[a]n accused is enti-
tled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays
the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." 6 In addition, the Supreme
74. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 853 n.9 (citation omitted).
75. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
76. Id. at 685.
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Court ruled more recently in Lockhart v. Fretwell "' that "an analysis ...
without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamen-
tally unfair or unreliable, is defective."78 Finally, many circuits have held
that cumulative effect may be investigated."
D. Failure to Provide Constitutionally Effective Mental Health Experts
Fisher argued that his court appointed mental health experts were
constitutionally ineffective and failed to discharge their constitutional duty
under Ake v. Oklahoma."0 The court of appeals noted that a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of expert witnesses, as distinct from the right to effective
assistance of counsel, was not a cognizable claim.81 As to the claim that
Fisher's court-appointed mental health experts failed to discharge their duty
under Ake, the Fourth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court of Virginia's
finding that because the claim was raised for the first time on state habeas it
was procedurally defaulted under the authority of Slayton v. Parrigan.82
The Fourth Circuit's resolution of this issue turned on the fact that the
claim was not raised on direct appeal. As the Fourth Circuit has by this
holding placed the burden of evaluating the professional performance of a
court appointed expert squarely on trial counsel, 3 this is a difficult claim to
preserve. Because the rules of procedural default apply as equally to claims
of unconstitutional assistance of experts as they do to other claims, defense
counsel essentially have a single course of action if they doubt their capacity
77. 506 U.S. 364 (1994).
78. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993).
79. See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "a
petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or ormis-
sions was [prejudicial]"); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that a
"claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel's
actions").
80. 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985) (holding "that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial
judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation
of the defense.)
81. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 853 (citing Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560, 1573 n. 12 (4th
Cir. 1993) (concluding that Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), "held only that due process
requires that an indigent defendant be provided with the services of a competent psychiatrist
at state expense when the defendant's mental condition is in issue"); Poyner v. Murray, 964
F.2d 1404, 1418-19 (4th Cir. 1992) (declaring "there is no separately-cognizable claim of
ineffective assistance of expert witnesses"); Waye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765, 766-67 (4th Cir.
1989) (per curiam) (same); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985)). See also Wilson v.
Greene, 155 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing requirements of court-appointed psychia-
trist's performance).
82. 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974) (holding claim which could have been, but was not,
raised on direct appeal may not be raised in collateral proceedings).
83. See Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 413 (4th Cir. 1998) (Michael, J. concurring).
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to evaluate the performance of their expert. In order to avoid the pitfall of
failing to preserve the claim, upon the slightest hint that the current expert
is failing to discharge his duty, defense counsel are advised to move for the
appointment of a second expert to evaluate the first, citing Fisher. If counsel
fails to raise the issue, he waives his right to do so on direct appeal or in any
collateral proceeding.84 Denial of the motion, however, should suffice to
preserve the claim.
E. Failure to Review For Proportionality
Fisher claimed that the Supreme Court of Virginia erred in failing to
review his sentence for proportionality. Fisher contended that because he
was the first defendant accused of murder for hire who had been sentenced
to death, or for that matter even tried for capital murder, his sentence was
grossly disproportionate to that received by other defendant's tried for
murder for hire." The court of appeals rejected Fisher's contention on the
ground that because proportionality review is not a right to which he was
entitled under the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Virginia's decision not to review his sentence was an independent state
ground over which the federal court did not have jurisdiction.86 Although
the court of appeals was correct in its finding that a state need not employ
proportionality review, it is incorrect to the extent it implies that a state
which chooses to employ proportionality review may pick and choose
which defendants do and do not receive it-doing so is a violation of the




84. See Anne Duprey, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 175 (1998) (analyzing Wilson v.
Greene, 155 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1998)).
85. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 854.
86. Id. (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51-53, (1984); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 67-68 (1991); Kornahrens v. Evatt; 66 F.3d 1350, 1357 (4th Cir. 1995)).
87. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (holding that where a state creates a right
not required under the United States Constitution, that state is nevertheless prohibited under
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution from arbitrarily depriving a
petitioner of such a right) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)). See also Alix M.
Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 449 (1999) (analyzing Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d
293 (Va. 1999)).
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